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Aspect s of the Optima l Intere st Rate

R. Albert Berry

In recent years it has ,been practio ners' conven tional ~nsdmn:. that intere
st
rates in less develop ed countr ies should be low; this means in practic e
''belo~-1 equilib rium" rates, if it is assumed that the margin al produc tivity
of capita l and the demand for credit are high, as appear s genera lly to be
the
case.

Public credit agencie s are particu larly prone to such policie s towards

agricu lture, lou income housing , and some other sectors ,

In some cases

restric tions placed on private sector intere st rates have a simila r effect,
e.g.suc h
such Government re<!'.ulations as intere st rate ceilinr ;s· the extent of inflati
on-
which may make it difficu lt to achieve a reasona ble real rate of intere st
because
the nomina l rate corresp onding to it looks so hirh, and the agility of the
banks in applyin g side conditi ons which raise the effecti ve rate of intere
st
above the nomina l one (such as minimum balance s and so on), determ ines the
extent to which the private sector is also charac terized by below equilib
rium
rates of intere st.
The wisdom of these policie s is obviou sly open to que9t1o n, and in recent
years severa l countr ies have given them up, with appare ntly positiv e results
.
The whole problem warran ts carefu l though t in any develop ing country .
The argume nt usually presen ted in favor of a below equilib rium intere st
rate
is that it is require d to stimul ate investm ent, given the risky nature of
investm ent in less develop ed countr ies, the possib le risk aversio n of
entrep reneur s, and so on.

There are also argume nts not arguing for. a genera lly

helm., equilib rium rate but for a policy of mainta ining selecte d rates
below

equilib rium, where it is though t that a given industr y has extern al econom
ies,
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higher private than social risk, or some such chat:ac teristic.

tn such cases

the argument would imply that, although the int:eres t rate should be be.low
the overall eqµilibr ium for these sectors , for others it should be above it.
With such an argument there can be no quarrel in princip le.

But the argument

for an overall below equilibr ium rate 5 which is usually the result of some
sub-sec tors maintain ing such rates, appears to have little theoret ical or
practic al defense .

The li!,rgume,-:1.t is simple~ wllere the total amount of savings

is a positive function of the interes t rate paid to savers 5 t:hen ut,tless the
government itself subsidiz es the recipien ts of the below equ:J,librium interes t
.
..
.

'

~

.

.

.

rates--p aying a higher rate or allo~ing a higher rate to be paid to savers than
is paid by borrowe rs, then the interes t rate sav,rs receive is belc:,w equilibr ium,
with the -.:-esult that total 1:1.avin~s
decreasecJ..

~4, ~,<.rrresponding, total investment: will be

This, lo.ss can t>;e s~~n in Figure 1, wher~ t~e equilibri1.1Dl interes t

rate Re would cgrresp~A<i t~ a~ am?unt o! savin$s Se, bµt where the biteres t
rate

fs

maintain ed at th.e below equilibr iugi level R

0

savings is only S

0

•

?

so the total amount of

Sinc::e investmf;nt is equal t() savings , it is natural ly less

with a lower interes t rate than with a higher one; t.he luc~r recipien ts of
the loans benefit and a~ e~ces.s detn,and for cred.it

tnay

be anticipa ted.

The

margina l borrowe r receive.a a sul:>sidy o~ up to EF, 1 ~mere subsidy refers to the
di£feren ce between the co.st of cradit n:1d it1;1 value in use, for the margina l
borrowe rs.

This disequilibr:f.u:n sitqatio n., 11t least in

t~~

st:mple model posited

here, where there is no separati on of market, reduces nationa l income by a
minimum of EAF; since t.he demand c1.1rve for credit represeµ ts the disco~n ted
1

·. .

He receive s EF in that ~pecial ~a$~ where the non-pric e rationin g of
credit channel s it tqr•r,rrd 'thos~ client~ wit:h the high~~t deinand price.
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value of future produc tivity of capita l for the borrow er and the supply
curve represe nts the opport unity cost to the lender , the area between
these
two curves and betwee n the actual amount of savings and the equilib rium
amount measur es the minimu~ loss to he society from the existen ce of
the below
equilib rium intere st rate.

The loss will normal ly be greate r than this,

since the rationi ng proced ure which replace s the price mechan ism may
be assumed
to be less

efficie nt and to fail to select those potent ial borrou ers with

the highes t demand price as recipie nts of the funds.
in this situati on

As just noted, there is

an excess der.>and for credit (equal to FH in Figure 1);

some credit hunters will have relativ ely low payoffs to the credit they
receive ,
being candid ates to receive it only because of the low intere st rate.

If,

through an ineffic ient rationi ng procedu re sol'le of the louer demand price
borrow ers receive credit and some of the hir,h demand price borrow ers
do not

receiv e it, the total loss ~i~ht be severa l times EAF; at the extreme
, if the
ex-:ess demand were eq~al to the total amount of savin:1:s availab le, (in
other
words, os

0

prices (all

=

s 0s)

~

and the set of potent ial recipie nts with the lowest demand

R , of course) get the credit, then totaL
0

the disequi libriur :i intere st rate policy would be BEFR

0

loss due to

- FAn.

1

In the absence

of more complex assuMp tions, loss fron the disequ ilibrium policy will
lie somewhere
between the minimun level EAF and the maximum level BEFR

0

1

- FAE, depend ing on the

The total benefi t from the existen ce of the savings transfe r Market
(in
which funds are transfe rred from savers to investo rs) in equilib riun
is BAR
(the gain to borrow ers) plus B.AR' (the gain to savers ). In the disequ
ilibrium
situati on referre d to in the texf, the rain to savers is reduced to :1.
Fc
and
0
the gain to borrow ers is EHF ( the differe nce. between the demand prices
of the
borrow ers actua1 ly receivi ng funds and the cost of the credit to them);
the
differe nce between the gain in this case and that in the equilib rium
case is
seen to be the area cited in the text.
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efficien cy of the rationin g systeM, where efficien cy is defined by the allocati on
of credit to those with the highest denand price. 1
The contenti on that a low interes t rate will stimula te investm ent is of
course errone·.o us when investm ent is linited to savings and the lm-, interes t
. 1 us to savings
.
rate is a stL.~u
. 2 Any attempt to increase the demand for a low
investm ent by low interes t rates and to satisfy it by money creation uill be
inflatio nary and will not increase the real amount of investm ent even though it
will increase investm ent in monetary terms. 3 (The acceptan ce of the "low interett
1

A frequen t and rather well supporte d allerati on with respect to credit
systems which do not operate on a price rationin g basis is that in fact "firms
with low demand prices receive credit, because they have good connecti ons with
the banks. If it may be assumed , as is probable , that the demand ~rice for
credit should be relative ly lou on the part of large capital intensiv e firms
and higher for firms i;,i th smaller amounts of capital and presuma bly therefor e
with higher margina l ;,roduct ivity of capital, then the fact that the large firms
usually have good connecti ons and can achieve credit at ,,ill is hiP;hly consiste nt
with this proposi tion, both in terms of the product ivity with uhich credit may be
used and in terms of its income distribu tion inpact.
2

The argumen t presente d here is based on the assumpt ion that the supply
curve of savings is positive ly sloped; savings theorist s are not fully agreed
on this issue, some arguing that there is little relation betueen the two
variabl es; if the savinp;s curve were vertica l then the only loss to the society
as a whole from the disenuil ibrium interes t rate policy ~v0uld be the probable
ineffici ency of the rationin g system to replace the narket.
If the offer curve of savings ~-,ere backuard bending~ the use of a below
equilibr ium interes t rate would foster savings , and unless the loss from in
efficien cy of the rationin g procedu re were freat, the net effect on the gronth
rate could be positive . -):::ve~ i11 this case, thoughj Felfare theory indi.c~~~ s that
the non-equ ilibrium rate lowers welf~re ; Le. a ·too hi?,h level of s·avings can
lower welfare when the opportu nity cost is high enough. Eere the question of whether
individ uals' preferen ces can be construe d as the sole determin ant of the optimal
savings rate becomes particu larly crucial, although that issue arises in the
other cases as well.
3Abstrac
ting from the unlikely possibi lity that the develoni ng country
finds itself in a generali zed Keynesi an situatio n.
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rate argument 11 seems to be in part a result of the fallacy of composition,
wherevby the fact that to the individual borrower a low interest rate is at
tractive, leads to the conclusion that it is beneficial as a whole). Since
the above analysis is oversimplified(especially given the assumption of a single
credit market through which all savings flow and on which all investment is
based) the results flowin~ from it cannot be imbued with much confidence; in
the next section the model is complicated by allowing for different types of and
uses for savings.
Alternative Uses of Savings (from the savers point of view)
A saver can choose among several alternative ways of disposing of his funds;
for present purposes it is useful to distinguish four categories: direct use of
the savings (by himself) in some investment project; lending then in the finan
cial markets, i.e., savings deposits, purchases of bonds, purchases of stocks,
etc.; holding them in the form of cash; and investment in non-reproduceable
1
and/or unproductive physical assets.

To ascertain the implications of a non-equilibrium interest rate it is
necessary to analyze in some detail how allocation among these forms of savings
is related to the interest rate, as well as understanding how total savings
depend on that rate. 2
1
As explained below, this category refers to that whole group of assets an
increased demand for which does not lead to an increase in the total productive
capital stock, either because supply is perfectly inelastic (e.g., land) or the
capital good will not be used immediately (e.g., an .asset held for speculative
reasons).
2
A full understanding of the choice of assets requires consideration of the
attributes or characteristics of such assets which are important to the saver.
Yield, risk, and liquidity are usually assumed to be the big ones. How these
attributes vary among the four asset groups distinguished above, and how such
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(Footnote 2 continued from page 5)
differences depend on such conditions as the rate of price change will underlie.
much of the discussion to followo
The relevance of the distinction by savings channels depends on their being
related to four possible effects of savings: the effects of interest are (a) in
creased demand for prociuctive capital by the saver, resulting in an increased
supply of that capital, (b) increased deilland for productive capital by someone
else (to whom the funds have been transferred)~ resulting in an increased supply
of that capital, (c) increased demand for assets where the increased demand does
not lead to an increased supply of any capital good--either because the demand
is for a non-reproducible capital good (like land) or because it is for a consumer good (e.g", consumer durables) the stimulation of whose output--even if it
occurs--does not increase the total productive capacity of the economic system,
(d) increased demand for money balances. Our four savings channels are designed
to correspond to these four effects, though inevitably the relation is not c9m
plete. Thus, if the supply elasticity of a certain producible capital good is
zero (in the relevant pri.ce range) the effect on total capital stock of an
increase in demand fo:r it is zero; the effect is the same as if the good were
not producible. Or it may be that transferred savings are invested in ways
which do not increase the capital stock.
Note that savings which leads to increased production of a capital good
which is in excess supply at..d underutilized (as often argued in the case of
luxury housing) really corresponds to category (c) above. Also falling in this
category is the purchase in advance of use (of in advar.ce of the time of purchase
had the capital market functioned be.:ter) '.>f consume1· durables; until consumed,
their holding as inventory const:1.tutes the b.oldi.ng of unutilized capital.
It is clear tl~at the in:f.tia1 or partial impact of the use· of savi·ags will
not generally be the same as: its ge.nera.1 equilibrium effect, the latter naturally
being much harder to e~1aluate. The discussion here is based essentially on the
assumption that the general equilibrium effects of different uses differ in the
same direction (though obviously not necessarily in the same degree) as the
partial or direct effects. While such an assumption certainly seems more ap
propriate than its opposite, it implies that the analysis is only a first step,
and would have to be substantially complicated before firm conclusions could be
drawn.
A furtb.e.r real world complication is that the various effects distinguished
here come :i.n all degrees, e.g. ~ the effect of an increase in demand for a given
capital good on its output is not necessarily either zero or equal to the
demand, it is usually between these two extremes. In this respect, too, our
discussion oversimplifies an<l makes distinctions in kind which in the real
world are much more likely to be differences in degree. Note that monetary
savings e.re. ,~c-.1.ally prcsu:ned to lE.ad to an amount of investment equal to the
savings, but th:i.o is in fact a matter requiring analysis.
The conditions which give ea('h savings channel its yield, risk, and
liquidity characteristics are clearly big elements in any discussion such as
the present cneo
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In Figure 2, plausible relationships between these various forms of savings
and the interest rate are traced out.

The implicit assumption is that

total

savings are a positive function of the rate of interest as indicated by the

S t slt • Note that the rate of interest measured on the vertical axis is

curve

that corresponding to transferred savings; the rate of return is not generally the
same for .all forms and it remains to consider what relationship, if any, exists·

among the rates correspondin~ to the different assets.

To the extent that

the real rate of interest on money balances (zero when there is no inflation or
deflation) is a function of the rate of interest in the transferred savings
market,

1

the analysis presented here is too simple; some complications are con-

sidered below.
Holding constant (e.g., at the level zero) the real rate of interest on
money balances, it may be assumed that those balances will be a negative func
tion of the (real) rate of interest on transferred savings, as suggested by
the curve Smm
S1 •

A similar monotonically negative relationship may be expected

to hold with respect to own investments of savings (shown by the curve S

0

s10 )

though here it must be assumed that the rate of return on such investments is
a (positive) function of the rate of interest on transferred savings. 2
relative position of curves like

1
1
S s and S s
o o
mm

The

would of course vary with the

individual or entity, but is not considered further here, since we are inter
ested essentially in their relative relationships with the rate of interest
1
i.e., to the extent that events in the savings markets help. to determine
the rate of inflation.
2

Assuming that each saver has a diminishing rate of return to capital in
own investment~ a lowered r on transferred savings--leading him to effect more
own investment--will lower-that rate of return as well. The precise relation
ship between the two rates would depend on the individualvs preference system,
among other things, and need not concern us'here.

-8Market Equilibrium Savings C"~ves, By Use of Savings
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on transferred savings.

Another savings use mentioned--application to the pur

chase of non-reproducible or non-productive assets (which 9 as the term indicates,
may or may not be used in the production process),

1

bears a less obvious relation

1 rt is useful at this point, to distinguish between the market equilibrium
9
savings curves for the population as a whole-(as shown in Fig. 2) and the
curves of a representative individual who, at a point of time, takes as con
stant all those variables exogeneoGs to him except the t-s rate of interest.
Figure 3 could repr2sent the p~eferences of such an individual. If the equi
librium rate of inter0st is taken as bnse,(i.e., if the individual assumes
that, as the t-s i~terest rate is m&nipulated, all other variables exogenous
to him will remain cor.sta:c-t at tr~e level corresponding to the situation where
R = R) the representative :individual and the economy would have the same per
centa~e dist:r:tbutio1,.s of sci-rings at that equilibrium rate, but not at other
interest rates, since the individual is assumed not to take into account the
changes in other va:::•::_s.bles ~vhich :\'."esult indirectly from the change in the t-s
interest rate; i.e. , ~o-:\en the i11-:erest rate is Re~ the representative sa:ver
distributes his savings in the propor::i.ons indicat~d in Figure 2 (RM in the
e
form of monetary savings 1 KO in the form of own investment 9 RN in the n-p
assets, and R T in t,~ansfor~ed savings 1 to give a total of R J'y. Comparing
Figure 3 curv~s to th')Se of Fignre 2 1 :::..ndica"':es how the chan~e of other vari
ables accompanving the decr,":ase in the interest rate from R to R0 leads to
different savi~gs p 1tt:,:r11.s from those which would be extrap5lated by the
summation of ir.dividual exp,~ctations when the interest rate was still R • (The
individual's savings disU~ibution at the interest rate R is comoosed of R 0 9
of his own savings 1 R Nv of n-p asset purch.ases 9 R 11v ~n the m~netary fo~,
and R T' in transferrgd savings to give a total of R0 Q. "(,,,rnat the individual
does &ot predict correctly in forming his ex ante plans on savings composition
at R0 is the r-ise in price of n-p a.ssets ~ or, what is the same thing, the
fall in R associated with the fall in R (it is also possible that the
return onnRis own investment is related to the amount of such investment carried
out by others and/or the runount of investment based on savings transfers. The
"expected" relationship L-1 each case is presumably negative, though there
would be many exceptions). It would be extreme to assume that no fall in R
would be expected by the individual, but it seems likely that he will under~p
estimate the full extent of this general equilibrium effect. Such an under
estimate would imply that his ex ante n-p savings would be above the level
actually resulting when R falls, i..e., R N1 of Fig. 3· > R ~:' .of Fig. 2 • If
his total savings at R were correctly p~edicted by the ind~vidual when R=R
then one or more of th~ other three savings forms would have to be underestimated
by him--ve:r.y possibly all would be. Whether he will over or underestimate his
savings at R depends on which of the price effect (one form of investment yields
0
less ex post than he predicted) the wealth illusion effect (his n-p assets rise
in price more than he expected) and the liquidity effect (his liquidity rises
more than he predicted) predominate. In Fig, 3 we assume no error in prediction
of total savings
A ::epresentativ.2 individual vs curves could be drawn based on
each eother possible t-s interest ;:ate (i.e.) assuming the values of all other
variables in the s:;rstern at the levels corrc~sponding to each other t-s interest
rate). The curves of F1g. 2 .::..rE,,in effe~t 1 the loci of the positions of each
curve at the ~ used as base for d;:-awing the curves in a given figure; i.e., the
Fig. 2 levels of each form of sa·-1ings at R.. correspond to the ex ante levels
shown by the curves correspcndin
<> to the eiistence of R. and the associated
6
1
levels of the other vc:.riaoles endogenous to the system.
j

-10Ex Ante Saving-s Curves of the· Representative
Individual When
. R • Re

S'
t

sm

snp

s
Savings
,,·
Figure 3
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to the interest rate even in the absence of any relationship between the rate of
inflation and the rate of interest on transferred savings.

There is, however,

much reason to expect a relationship between the rate of interest on these goods
and the rate on transferred savings (or other uses) especially in the case of
non-reproducible assets like land, but also for real estate and some other assets.
Factors helping to determine this relationship are the differences between transn-p 1

£erred-saving assets and

assets in char~cteristics other than capital (i.e.,

risk and liquidity) and the mobility of investors between the two types of as
In a world without risk or illiquidity

sets.

or inflation, and with perfectly

mobile investors (as between assets) the rate of return on
be the same as on transferred-savings assets.

n-p

assets would

The price of the former would

change in such a way as to make the rental/~rice ratio co~respond to the (general)
interest rate, thus a rise in r would lead to a lowering of price.

Such asset

price changes might or might not have wealth or liquidity effects on the over

all savings--interest rate relation--see the discussion below.

If, for whatever

reason (e.g., lack of familiarity) investors are somewhat immobile between assets,
the rate of return on

n-p

assets will be a positive function of but will not

move by the same amount as the
attractiveness of

n-p

t-s 2

interest rate.

Finally» the more the

assets to the marginal buyers lies in features different

from yield (like low risk or high liquidity), the less will the rate of return
in this market be tied to that of the

t-s

market. 3 Whatever the precise

1

This symbol will henceforth be used to refer to non-reproducible and/or
non currently productive assets.
2

Transferred savings.

3

we abstract here from the multitudinous second-order effects which come into
play in the real world~ e.g., the risk attached to the holding of n-p assets
is in turn a function of the extent to 11hich that market is tied to the t-s
market.

-12-

values of these various relevant coefficient s, the normal relation between an
individual' s ex ante investment in the n-p market and the t-s interest rate will
be negative; the two interest rates will tend to move in the same direction.
Since the supply of n-p goods is fixed (or nearly so) the change in demand for
them leads to changes in their price.

This means that the negative relationshi p

between ex ante savings channelled to the n-p market and the rate of interest on
transferred savings does not show up in the market equilibrium curve correspond
ing to this market; by definition that curve coincides with the vertical axis,
unless in fact the production of some goods falling in this category does have
positive elasticity.

In that instance the market equilibrium curve will have

1
negat i ve s~ope.

1
The transferred savings curve, indicated by stst
shows the positive relationship which that variable is expected to bear to the real rate of interest.
Note that even if total savings are not a positive function of the interest rate
on transferred savings, transferred savings are almost certain to be, unless
the overall relationship is quite negative.

The price effect of a higher E.

should have a positive effect on the share of total savings which are transferred .
Two other effects are likely to be at work.

The conventiona l income effect,

whereby the greater ease of achieving a given future consumption level is ex
pected to lead--other things being equal--to an increase in present consumption
1

As indicated above, durable consumer goods which the individual plans to
use himself later will fall into this category, and the demand for them will be
a decreasing function of the interest rate on transferred savings; demand for
durable consumer goods which the individual does not plan to use himself must
be speculative in some sense of the term, although he need not be expecting an
increase in the real value of the assets, if the real rate of interest on money
isj for examplei negative then the individual would be expected to speculate on
certain forms of final consumer goods or other goods as long as their rate of
return were expected to be less negative than that of money itself.
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(decrease in savings); in other words it works against the price effect.

A

second effect referred to above works through the price of non-reproducib le or
slowly reproducible capital goods and may better be termed a combination liquidity
income effect.

In the absence of significant wealth illusion-its effect will be

in the same direction as the price effect.
like land.

Consider a non-reproducib le asset

An increase in r would lead to a decrease in the demand for land

(a now relatively less attractive asset) and as a result a decrease in its price.
(The price decrease gives sufficient incentive to buyers so that there is a
holder for every unit of these assets.)

One effect of the price decrease, is

to lead to a decrease in wealth; although the real productive capacity of the
system stays the same its value in terms of power to purchase current consumer
goods decreases.

This would appear to constitute a factor tending to increase

the total savings rate.

If, however, the asset holders consider not the con

sumer goods purchaseable now with their assets but those purchaseable in the
future, nothing has changed.

In the absence of a .iwealth illusion" whereby

the individual does believe his wealth level has fallen 1 no change might occur.
One effect, however~ is a decrease in his liquidity (relevant in the event, for
example, that contrary to his basic plan he should have to realize some of these
assets before he planned) and this could lead to a justifiable increase in
savings to offset that liquidity reduction.

In short, it appears that the only

plausible effect which might work against a positive savings--intere st rate
return would be the conventional income effect.
To summarize this section: as a first step in the (necessarily more compli
cated) analysis of the impact of manipulations of the transferred savings inter
est rate, we have assumed that such manipulations do not lead either directly

-14-

or indirectly to changes in the rate of inflation and we have ignored most
second order effects.

Such interactions do not create any conceptual problems,

since the curves presented in Figure 2 can be thought of as the market equili
brium paths of the variables in question (in response to a change in the t-s
interest rate} for any degree of complexity in the economic system.

Figure 2

should be interpreted as taking into account those general equilibrium impacts
which have been included in the discussion.

As we see below, the curves could

have quite different shapes in economic systems with different characteristics,
e.g., if the rate of interest acts through other variables, like inflation, back
on the variables discussed here.

In the discussion presented above, the only

indirect impact considered on savings was that of the increase of private wealth
due to the increased tendency to invest in non-reproducible assets, and since
this would normally be expected if anything to decrease total savings, it would
· ·
s i mp 1y accen t uate t h e positive
'
'
s t "c- 1t curve anu.3 s,rou ld, not change the
S..LOpe
o f tne
,,.. ~

qualitati.ve nature of the arp-ument.
The Influence of Inflation and Its Interaction with the Variables Considered
It seems probable that in most economic systems the inflation rate is
associated with voluntary savings via a process whereby the government feels
obliged to undertake a certain amount of spending on infrastructure and other
services, and possibly also to allocate a minimum amount of credit to the private
sector, somewhat independently of the level of the voluntary savings. 1

When this

is the case, the rate of inflation and the level of savings are likely to be
1

Put more generally, if voluntary savings are low, the government is likely1
among the feasible policj.packages available to it, to prefer one which involves
inflation.
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inversely related; such a condition means that the assumption (used in the above
discussion) that inflation is not an endogenous variable to the system is in
correct.

The analysis may also differ somewhat if a rate of price change not

equal to zero is assumed, even though it is not related causally to the other
variables considered.

This case is discussed first, since it is simpler than

that involving interaction of inflation and the other variables.
Conceptually it is possible (though in the real world not very probable)

that the presence of inflation will not affect those real variables which deter
mine the rate of return on own investment
were the casej then these

t:1,10

or on transferred savings; if this

curves might not be expected to shift as between

a non-inflationary situati0'1 and an inflationary one, provided that either the
other two curves did not shiftj or that there wer no causal links between the
two pairs of curYes.

It seems clear, however, that each form of savings is a

substitute in some degree for each of the others; since the curve S S1 would
mm
shift to the lefts by a greater amount the higher the level of inflation it may
be anticipated that the transferred savings and own-investment curves will shift
to the right, relative to those of Figure 2.
is

1
The effect on the S S
np np

curve

less predictable; it seems probable~ however, that this curve will also

shift to the right, 1 since n-p assets may be rather close substitutes for money
balances for many people, i.e., the lower rate of return on liquidity is likely
to lead to an increasing tendency--other things being equal·--to invest in non
productive assets; this will generate a greater upward trend in their prices

1As observed in the preceding
section, for this curve not to coincide with
the vertical axis, there must be. some producible goods (with positive supply
elasticity in the rele,:rant p~dce. range) included in the n-p category. We are
assuming that in this disc1~ssion.
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than would otherwise occur, or more precisely~ a higher real price series over
time for these assets than would have evolved in the non-inflationary situation 1
for the non-reproducible items in the bundlej and a greater supply of the pro
ducible ones.

If it is true that total savings is a positive function, other

things being equal, of the attractiveness of each form of savings, then total
savings will be less under inflationary circu~stances.
Analysis of the overall impact of inflation of course

must take into account

the distribution of the additional spending which caused it in the first place. 2
If that spending was oriented more towards investment than was the reduction in
real purchases by persons so affected,
savings could be positive.

then the total impact on investment and

In the extreme case where inflation resulting from

government investment did not decrease the savings of the private sector at all,
it woulc be almost a foregone conclusion that total savings and investments would
rise as a result of it.

Or in a case where all the additional spending was on

consumption, the impact would almost certainly be negative; only if the wealth
effect on savings was very strongly positive could this result be avoided.
Inflation as an Endogenous Variable
In the preceding section, it was assumed that the rate of inflation was an
exogenous variable, and although it affected the relative attractiveness of
various forms of savings, it was not causally related to interest rate policy.
In fact, both a low voluntary savings rate (which is likely to result from a
below equilibrium interest rate)and the high demand created by a below equilibrium
1

An additional factor likely to be at work in situations where the rate of
inflation fluctuates, and in so doing creates greater relative price uncertainty
for some products than for others--and greater fluctuations in the real value.
2Assuming
the inflation is basically of the demand pull type.
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rate, are likely to put inflation ary pressures on the system. 1 With the rate of
inflation a negative function of the interest rate~ the market equilibriu m curves
of the savings variables considere d here are altered.

Assume that with the equi

librium interest rate R inflation ary pressures are just under control, but with
e
any lower interest rate, inflation would result.
The effect of this complicat ion is to make market equilibriu m curve analysis
more difficult ; in some cases it appears to make the curves more elastic to the
interest rate than otherwise , but others it throws even their slopes into question.
Consider the savings in money balances curve; in the absence of inflation it had
a clearly negative slope, but if the rate of inflation is a decreasin g function
of the t-s interest rate, the inflation

correspon ding

to a low interest rate

would tend to discourag e the holding of money balances so the slope of this
curve is undefine d--it could be negative or positive. 2 In the case the own inves.tment: curve ..which in the absence of inflation bears a negative relations hip to
the interest rate, that relations hip should be stronger under inflation , 3 since
the holding of money balances is less attractiv e than in the previous case.
The slope of the n-p savings curve will probably also be lower than before, i.e.,
its elasticit y to the interest rate will be greater than before, partly because
money balances are less attractiv e, and partly because of the greater relative
1

In turn the presence of inflation is difficult to reverse because it makes
high real interest rates difficult to alter due to institutio nal restrictio ns
weighing against high nominal rates.
2
under inflation , the nominal t-s interest rate is, of course, above the
real one. Choosing a real t-s interest rate is a less straightfo rward maneuver,
since policy normally acts directly on the nominal rate. But under normal as
sumptions with respect to the financing of the economy, there will be a monotonic
relations hip between the two rates so th.at with full knowledge of that relation
it remains possible to set the real rate at the desired level.
3Even if the
rate of interest on transferr ed savings does not contain a
higher risk component than before (due to variation s in the rate of inflation )
it may well be assumed to have.
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price uncertainty frequently built into inflationary situations.

If this is so,

a decrease in the real interest rate which causes inflation will lead to a
greater increase in real wealth associated with n-p assets than would a non
inflationary decrease in the interest rate, hence the negative impact of the low
t-s interest rate on total savings will be greater than in the other cases con
sidered~
Summary and Further Considerations
The above analysis has focussed on three ways in which the transferred
savings interest rate is related to savings behavior and the contribution of
savings to welfare, with a view to ascertaining in particular whether a below
equilibrium rate is likely to constitute a wise policy.

Aspects considered were

(a) the efficiency of allocation of transferred savings according to whether

price rationing or some other form of rationing is used (b) the way in which
the allocation of savings among forms (transferred, invested by the saver, put
in money balances or purchase of non-reproducible assets and/or non-productive
assets) is related to the transferred-savings interest rate and the impact of
this allocation on total savings, the efficiency of resource utilization and
(c) the overall impact on total savings.

Theory provides no answer as to whe

ther, in a country with substantial capital market and other imperfections, the
optimal rate of interest is the equilibrium one, (or ones, given the existence
1 i.e., the
short run impact of the low interest rate on savings via the
wealth effect should be particularly negative, whether the long run impact is
less severe is unclear; possibly failure of real wealth to rise as fast it other
wise would have creates an incentive for higher savings. But though the long
run impact may be mitigated by this factor it could not reverse the overall re
sult. And if "vicious circle" type phenomena come into play over time, the
short run impact could be accentuated over time.
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somewhat separa ted marke ts) but it does provid e intere sting guide
lines on the
mecha nisms by which higher or lower intere st rates may affect
the situat ion.
Theory sugge sts that below equili brium intere st rates run a high
risk of (a) lower
ing total saving s, (b) worsen ing the alloca tion of transf erred
saving s among
borrow ers, and (c) promo ting inflat ion which in itself is likely
to discou rage
savers and furthe r lower the saving s rate. 1
Even if it were possib le to ascert ain the coeffi cients introd
uced into the
above analy sis and which are necess ary compo nents of an answer
to the.in terest
rate questi on--so me impor tant unknowns would remain to be consid
ered, in particula r the relati ve social effici ency of saving s used in the
variou s ways cited.
If a saver had the altern ative of invest ing his own funds or
transf erring them
throug h the system , but a peso of transf erred saving s did not
lead to a peso of
invest ment, then the net effect on saving s (inves tment) of the
transf er would
be negati ve.

The coeffi cients of "net .addit ional invest ment to additi onal
trans

ferred saving s" may be greate r than one or less than one; this
factor must be
borne very much in mind.i n the analy sis of the relati ve effi~i
ency of the two
forms.

Both the saver 's and the poten tial borrow er's own invest ment
curves

1one
perhap s extrem e framew ork within which the savin gs-int erest rate-
inflat ion nexus could be viewed would includ e a public sector
with inflex ible
goals on public invest ment-- which are satisf ied by money creati
on regard less of
the level of inflat ion--t he impact on privat e sector saving and
invest ment might
then be deduce d and the relati on betwee n the origin al nomin al
intere st rate and
the result ing real intere st and total saving s levels traced out.
One argum ent
. mentio ned above was that the impact of a below equili brium saving
s rate would be
to increa se pressu res on the public entiti es to disper se more
credit than other
wise; this might sugge st a tenden cy for total invest ment to rise
(assum ing the
credit is sough t prima rily for invest ment purpo ses). If the
negati ve wealth
effect s of the inflat ion fell espec ially on people with high
wealth elasti cities
to consume? this could easily occur. It might even be that
a low govern ment
capac ity to save would promo te invest ment, if via an initia l
negati ve impact on
the real intere st rate (throu gh govern ment borrow ing from the
centra l bank) it
raised the demand for privat e invest ment credit and satisf ied
that demand via
furthe r money creati on which cut :Lnto privat e consum ption.
In short, while the genera l case may have inflat ion loweri ng
the saving s
rate, this cannot be taken for grante d.

-20are involved; whether total investment r·1seswhen a dollar is transferred depends
on the relationship between transferred savings and own savings for the trans
ferrer and for the borrm·1er, as well as the relative efficiency of use of savings
by the two.

Innumerable empirical situations can be conceived.

generalizations can be made" however.

Some further

Probably the easiest of the.

relation

ships to analyze in this context is that between transferred and own invested
savings.

In a riskless world with no transfer costs, the individual would equate

the rate of return on his own investment (R) and the rate of return on transo
ferred savings investment (Rt). In the real world the rate of return he himself
would receive on transferred savings (Rti) would be equal to the gross social rate
of return on that invest~ent (Rts) minus (a) the real cost of transfer (Rct),
(b) any above normal profits involved in the intermediation process (Rfft) and
(c) the differential earned by the borrower as a result of being able to borrow
the funds O\t); (~1e assume

in other words that typical borrower is not the

marginal borroTTer, whose demand price interest rate is equal to the supply price
interest rate). 1

Assuming pure competition in the intermediation service it pays,

both from an individual and a social point of view, to distribute savings so as
to push the rate of return on m•m investment down farther than that on transferred
savings due to the unavoidable real cost of the transfer; if there are monopoly
profits in the intermediation process, however, too many funds tend to go into
own investment, relative to the social optimum.

In a world with risk, direct

utility or disutility from certain ways of do:lng things, etc., a number of other
such factors must be taken into account.

Some individuals probably have a pref

erence to control their own investment even at a lower interest rate than what they
could recaive in transferred savings; others have the opposite preference.
1

In terms

For the marginal borrm•,er, this last term drops out, Rts being also below
the average R~s on ·all funds passing through the market. In terms of efficiency
of resource allocation, it is the marginal borrower uho matters, of course.
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of overall welfare maximization it is appropriate that these preferences be an
input

into the determination of the distribution of funds between the two uses,

so there is no reason to expect inefficiency to result from them.
The risk problem is something different.

It is frequently the case that

risk is less on transferred savings, since the ultimate combination of invest
ments which they support is more varied and balanced than that which an individual
would have; for this reason he may tend to transfer to a point where the average
rate of return to him on transferred savings is below that on his own invest
ment; given the lack of a perfect market to insure him against fluctuations in
the rate of return on his own investment, this is presumably optimal since his
own welfare is directly lowered if he has to bear too high a risk level.
second form of risk, however, may create inefficiencies.

A

The saver who in trans

ferring his savings runs a risk of being deceived in some way or other by the
recipient of the funds opti:::al

may be expected to decrease his savings trans

fer below its otherwise opti"'lal level; this will tend to lower total national
income as traditionally measured, i.e., assumin~ the sane narginal utility of
income for each person;

If certain interpersonal comparisons (for example,

assuming that the deceivers should be assigned a lower marginal utility of in
come than the honest people) are made, this result ~rould not necessarily hold.

It

is possible, of course, that sooe individuals will have to little risk aversion of
this sort, for their own good, and this could also decrease total income by
encouragin~ entreµreneurs to enter the deception industry.
The impact of the below equilibrium interest rate on transfer savings is,
as noted above, likely to lead to some redistribution towards own investment of
savings and away from transfer.

If the marginal social productivity of the two
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uses was equal before, or would be equal under an equilibrium interest rate, it
will now, of course, be unequal and the overall efficiency of use of the savings
will have decreased.

If the marginal social productivity of transferred savings

was below that of own investment savings before, however, the opposite will be
the case, and the restriction on the transfer will lead to an increase in effi
ciency of resource utilization; if the opposite relation would hold with an
equilibrium interest rate, the loss will be increased by the new factor.

Empiri

cally speaking, most observers would probably argue that the marginal productivty
is higher on transferred savings than on own-used savings, due to lack of
familiarity with the capital markets, the fact that a demand for investment funds
usually reflects a good project with substantial payoff, the fact that funds are
frequently transferred from individuals with very few, if any, _nvestment
opportunities, and so on.

The relevant comparison is linked to the marginal

savers, however, and it remains an empirical question whether this is true or
not for them; it seems likely that those with very few alternatives for their
own savings will in fact be intramarginal transferers, i.e., they will transfer
even at a well below equilibrium interest rate; those whose transfer will or
will not occur, according to whether the interest rate is at equilibrium or at
some point below it, may have fairly good opportunities for own investment.
In fact it would appear that efficiency is very much a function of the par
ticular capital market in a given economy; some markets take funds from certain
types of borrowers and pass them to certain types of borrowers and other markets
involve different people on each side of the flow.

It seems probable for some less

developed countries that those markets nhich channel funds to large already capital
intensiva firms with ~enerally good access to funds may not be leading to any
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increase in national income.

In any case, the whole question is an empirical

one calling for a good deal of detailed study and disaggregation of the capital
market system.
The social productivity of savings which are held in money balances must be
appraised indirectly, and may depend substantially on the way in which the
monetary-fiscal system works, on the flexibility of prices in a downward direc
tion, and on a number of other factors.
The simplest situation in which to analyze this problem is one where either
prices are flexibk downwards so that a decrease in aggregate demand does not
lead to any non-utilization of resources, or where the government's counter
cyclical monetary and fiscal policies reinject into the circular flow any funds
removed permanently via savings in these forms.

Under these conditions has

the opportunity to determine the use of the resources freed by the saving in
question Gither the government or the monetary systern(or both
systems are well coordinated]

if the two

so the use would be final either in government

expenditures or credit from the backing system to the private sector which was
deemed to provide a higher payoff.

In either case, this is the most efficient

form of transfer in the broad sense of the term, since there is less inter
mediation cost in getting the funds from the saver to the investor than in the
typical case; for example, if the monetary system expands to make up for the
savings the costs are only those of allocating funds to the investors, not of
managing savings accounts, and so on.

In the case of the government the costs

are almost certainly much less, since the alternative is taxes and the collection cost of taxes plus possible disincentive costs may well be substantial.
1

It is true, of course that in a system which does not have mechanisms

1
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The conclusion that hoarding may be the most efficient form of savings from
a social point of view creates a complexity in the discussion of the optimum rate
of interest on transferred savings.

Assuming that an artificial decrease in

that rate (i.e., to a below equilibrium rate) will imply an increase both in own
investment and in hoarding (we abstract for the moment from the fourth possible
use--the purchase of

11

n-p assets, 11 it may well be the case that the substitution

of own investment for transferred savings implies a decrease in the efficiency
of resource utilization and the substitution of hoarding for transferred savings
implies an increase.

Finally, of course, there is the effect on total savings,

generally assumed to bP. negative.

In such a case there would be two substitu

tions tending to worsen th· allocati~-- of resour~es (includin 8 one between savings
and consumption) and a third tending to improve it; whether the net impact is
positive or negative bc~omes an empirical question. 1

The effects of the below

equilibrium interest rate could vary in different subsectors of the capital
market, and for different ranges of the transferred savings interest rates.

The

possibility that a below equilibrium rate would bring gains depends considerably,
it should be pointed out, on there not being any inflation so that the rate of
return on liquidity is at least not heavily negative.

If it is, it seems un

likely that many people will turn to liquid assets when the t-s interest rate
falls.
Footnote 1 continued from page 23.
available to assure the full utilization of resources, savings in the form of
hoarding may be the worst thing that can happen, since it involves a decrease in
aggregate demand on the part of one person with no compensating increase on any
one else's part; this is, of course, the Keynesian problem. But it is another
irony of economics that what is the worst possible phenomenon in the Keynesian
world may be the best possible phenomenon in a neoclassical or non-Keynesian world.
One could also argue, perhaps, that this transfer mechanism is not as ef
ficient as it appears in that it may lead to instability in the system with a
high level of liquidi~y. but thes~ problems are at a different level of discussion
from the ones we consider here.
1A further facto::: consi:iered above, of course)) is the presumed greater in
efficiency of distr:i.bution 0f transferred savings when the interest rate is
below equilibrium.

.J
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Another question frequently raised is the impact of the interest rate on
employment and income distribution.

It is frequently argued that low interest

rates favor highly capital intensive enterprises, and thereby restrain the
demand for labor, and create unemployment.

At one level of analysis the impact

of a below equilibrium interest rate on the demand for and price of labor is
fairly straightforward; given perfect markets for labor and assuming that in
spite of the below squilibrium price of capital all firms tend to have the same
relative marginal productivities of labor and capital, the below equilibrium
interest rate may be expected to lower the demand curve for labor and decrease
the equilibrium wage rate ,ria the discouragement of savings and decreased total
investment, in a system where the labor market is imperfect
create unemployment.

it might,instead,

Such an analysis, however, is not very instructive, since

it is almost a foregone conclusion that in the presence of a subsidy to the use
of capital to certain borrowers, other borrowers will not receive the subsidy,
the relative marginal productivities of labor and capital will not be the same
for all firms, and there will be not only an impact on the overall capital labor
ratio, but also an impact on the distribution of labor across firms; this com
plicates the effect on employment and/or the wate rate.

i·Jhether in fact the low

interest rate tends to generate high capital intensity is a complicated matter
whose analysis requires ·some consideration at least of the dynamics of firms of
different types in an eco~omy with this imperfection in the capital market.
generalizations seem warranted.

Few

